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DEBATING CONFLICTS: MEDICINE, COMMERCE,
AND CONTRASTING ETHICAL ORDERS
JanetL. Dolgin*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Every important social debate is grounded in a seminal
development in the history of ideas, and can be understood in proportion
as the relevant development is understood. The debate of concern to this
Article-that involving the appropriate relationship between physicians
and the pharmaceutical industry-is grounded in the development
known to historians as the shift in modem Western culture from status to
contract.'
Part II of this Article introduces that shift through reference to the
transformation of the family in the last decades of the twentieth century.
It then describes the consequences of the shift within the world of health
care. It briefly reviews the social history of medicine since the middle of
the twentieth century and describes that history in light of the shift from
status to contract. Then Part III focuses on one aspect of the broad shift
by examining contrasting understandings among physicians of the
parameters of medicine. In particular, Part III compares an ethical order
that continues to reflect traditional patterns in directing physicians'
conduct with an ethical order firmly committed to the values of the
marketplace. Physicians' contrasting attitudes toward links with
industry, and more specifically, toward rules of disclosure as a potential
antidote to bias, are illustrative. Finally, in conclusion, the Article
Jack and Freda Dicker Distinguished Professor of Health Care Law, Hofstra Law School.
B.A. (philosophy), Barnard College; M.A., Ph.D. (anthropology), Princeton University; J.D., Yale
Law School. I am grateful to Cindie Leigh, Reference Librarian, Hofstra Law School, for generous
assistance with bibliographic materials; to Michael Scarpa (Hofstra Law School, class of 2008) for
research help; and to Dr. Samuel Packer for sharing dialogue and research materials. Finally, I thank
Hofstra University, the Hofstra Cultural Center, and the Hofstra Law School for making possible
the conference out of which this Article developed.
1. See HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 98-100 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1977) (1861).
*
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suggests that the depth of the ideological 2 divide among physicians,
apparent in discourse about links with industry and, more generally, in
discourse about the profession's self-identity and scope, may augur a
dramatic division of3the medical profession into two essentially distinct
professional groups.
II.

FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT: THE CONCRETIZATION OF AN IDEA

The terms central to an understanding of the shift from status to
contract were defined over a century ago by the British social theorist,
Sir Henry Maine. Maine's vision of a social world defined through
relationships of "status" posits a system of values grounded in the nature
of things;4 in that world, the values are seen as immutable and as
providing the only acceptable guide to social relationships. In sharp
contrast, Maine's notion of "contract" reflects the conviction that all
systems of value are grounded in the preferences of particular
individuals, and should therefore be shaped and reshaped following
individual choice.5
Maine's understanding of status further describes a social universe
that insists that traditional institutions be preserved, in significant part by
insisting that individuals subordinate their needs and desires to the needs
and desires of traditional communities, and thus as a matter of principle,
restrict individual autonomy.6 Contract insists, as a matter of principle,
that the needs and desires of the autonomous individual be the primary
arbiter of social institutions.7 It further insists that those needs and
desires be established and re-established to reflect the perceived

2. By "ideology" and "ideological" this Article refers to a set of basic forms through which
people understand their world and act in that world. The term is not used here to refer to a system of
false or political beliefs. The use of ideology reflects that of the French anthropologist, Louis
Dumont. Dumont wrote:
Our definition of ideology thus rests on a distinction that is not a distinction of
matter but one of point of view. We do not take as ideological what is left out when
everything true, rational, or scientific has been preempted. We take everything that is
socially thought, believed, acted upon, on the assumption that it is a living whole, the
interrelatedness and interdependence of whose parts would be blocked out by the a priori
introduction of our current dichotomies.
Louis DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARX: THE GENESIS AND TRIUMPH OF ECONOMIC
IDEOLOGY 22 (1977).

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See infra Part III.C.I.c.
See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
MAINE, supra note 1, at 98-100.
See id.
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imperatives of autonomy-and that the rules governing their shifting
configurations be those that govern transactions in the marketplace. 8
In particular, Maine distinguished between those aspects of social
life defined through "family dependency" (and grounded in relations of
status) from those defined through "individual obligation" (contract). 9 In
Maine's view these domains of social life were not in balance. Rather
over time, the domain of contract had increasingly been encompassing
that of status.
The Individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of
which civil laws take account. The advance has been accomplished by
varying rates of celerity .... But whatever its pace, the change has not
been subject to reaction or recoil .... Nor is it difficult to see what is
the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those forms of
reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Family. It
is Contract.
... All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of Persons
were derived from, and to some extent are still coloured by, the powers
and privileges anciently residing in the Family. If then we employ
Status, agreeably with the usage of the best writers, to signify these
personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such
conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we may
see that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a
movementfrom Status to Contract.10

Maine's depiction is more useful in suggesting ideological
perspectives than it is useful as history." During most of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, for instance, everyday life in the United States
was viewed in terms of contrasting social domains, viewed respectively
through the parameters of "contract" and through the parameters of
"status." The contrast between home and marketplace (between family
and work), for example, clearly reflected the distinction between status
2
and contract.'

8. See id. at 99-100.
9. Id. at 98-100.
10. Id.at99-100.
11. See, e.g., JOHN J. HONIGMANN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL IDEAS 141
(1976) (criticizing ethnographic material on which Maine relied); Peter F. Drucker, The Employee
Society, 58 AM. J. Soc. 358, 358-59 (1953) (describing move in modem history from contract to
status).
12. See infra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
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The ParadigmaticCase: The Transformationof the Family

That contrast was especially central to Americans' views of
everyday life in the middle decades of the twentieth century. David
Schneider's anthropological study of American kinship, carried out
during the middle of the century, revealed the cultural salience of the
distinction between status and contract to understandings of and
expectations about family relationships.' 3 Schneider captured the sociocultural parameters of the family in the United States just before it began
dramatically to merge (as an ideological matter) with the world of work:
The set of features which distinguishes home and work is one
expression of the general paradigm for how kinship relations should be
conducted and to what end. These features form a closely
interconnected cluster.
The contrast between love and money in American culture
summarizes this cluster of distinctive features. Money is material, it is
power, it is impersonal and unqualified by considerations of sentiment
or morality. Relations of work, centering on money, are of a
temporary, transitory sort. They are contingent, depending entirely on
the specific goal-money....

...[T]he opposition between money and love is not simply that
money is material and love is not. Money is material, but love is
spiritual.The spiritual quality of love is closely linked with the fact
that in love it is personal considerations which are the crucial ones.
Personal considerations are a question of who it is, not of how well
they perform their task or how efficient they are. Love is a relationship
between persons.14
Schneider summarized the family in American culture as a social
unit of "enduring, diffuse solidarity."' 5 Generally, he explained, "[t]he
end to which family relations are conducted is the well-being of the
family as a whole and of each of its members."1 6 More particularly, the
American family circa mid-twentieth century reflected solidarity in that
relationships within the unit were (or were expected to be) "supportive,
helpful, and cooperative"; describing family relationships as "diffuse"
referred to the absence of a narrow "specific goal or... specific kind of
13. See DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 30-54 (1968).
14. Id. at48-49.
15. Id. at 50, 52 (emphasis omitted).
16. Id. at 50.
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behavior," and finally, family relationships were expected to "endure"-family 17cooperation had no "specific goal or ... specific limited time in
mind."
Moreover, so-called traditional18 family relationships were
grounded in a set of presumed statuses, defined largely through
20
reference to age and gender.' 9 Roles followed statuses. Hierarchy was
assumed and prized.
In contrast, the world of the marketplace (the world of "work") has
21
long prized the putatively equal autonomous individual. Whereas
people defined themselves in the traditional home through reference to
love, community, and enduring connection, people defined themselves,
and continue to define themselves in the marketplace through reference
to money, negotiated choice, and relationships forged in bargains and
not expected to last beyond the terms of the bargains that effected them.
The transformation of family patterns in the last decades of the
twentieth century occurred with stunning speed. Although the roots of
change had long been growing,22 public displacement of modes of
family relationships deemed close to sacred with modes of relationship
familiar to actors in the marketplace was accomplished as a practical
matter within a couple of decades. By the last years of the twentieth
century, American law defined adults within families as more like
23
business partners than like their family counterparts in an earlier time.
17. Id. at 52.
18. The term "traditional" is used here to describe the patterns of relationships common to the
American family between the start of the Industrial Revolution and the last decades of the twentieth
century. Essentially, it is the family that Schneider analyzed in American Kinship. See id. at 12-14.
19. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 6, 9-10
(1993) (noting that nineteenth-century families were predicated on assumptions about gender
differences, and noting that nineteenth-century family law assumed that family members would "act
in accordance with certain standard expectations that flowed from their statuses as husbands, wives,
fathers, and mothers").
20. Id.at9-10.
21.

See JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT, AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE

INAMERICAN HISTORY 31 (1986) (distinguishing the world of home from the contrasting world of
work, and describing the home as a refuge against the outside world).
22. Even in the nineteenth century, the seeds of later change were planted. The appearance of
the Married Women's Property Acts, providing married women with legal authority to control at
least some of their property, re-shaped relationships between husbands and wives. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HJSTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 209-11 (2d ed. 1985) (summarizing

Married Women's Property Acts).
23. Specific relevant changes include: the promulgation of no-fault divorce laws in the second
half of the twentieth century, see Doris Jonas Freed, Grounds for Divorce in the American
Jurisdictions (as of June 1, 1974), 8 FAM. L.Q. 401, 402-21 chart A (delineating divorce grounds in
the states in 1974); the acceptance of prenuptial agreements, see, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d
381, 383, 384 (Fla. 1970) (noting that such agreements in contemplation of divorce were previously
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Shifts in the World of Health Care. The Physician-Patient
Relationship

A similar transformation has occurred in the world of health care
during the last century. This section traces that transformation of
relationships within the world of health care from relationships grounded
in status to relationships grounded in contract. It first characterizes
health care, especially the physician-patient relationship, between the
last decades of the nineteenth century and the last decades of the
twentieth century.24 It briefly describes the commercialization of health
care in the second half of the twentieth century. It then depicts some of
the essential socio-cultural changes that have redesigned the scope of
medicine in the last several decades.
1. The World of Health Care Before Widespread
25
Commercialization
In the United States, the professionalization of medicine occurred in
the decades following the Civil War.26 By the end of the nineteenth
century, physicians began to see themselves as responsible for a body of
organized knowledge that could be taught and used for public benefit.2 7
By the early decades of the twentieth century, the American Medical
Association was functioning as a guild, focusing on the well-being of its
members.28 The development of a standardized curriculum for medical
training, 29 and the increasing respect Americans showed for professional

seen to violate public policy and taking judicial notice of increase in rate of divorce); and that by the
start of the twenty-first century at least one state provided for marriage between people of the same
gender, see Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding the ban on
same-gender marriage unconstitutional).
24. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, medicine was largely unregulated.
Physicians, for instance, were not licensed. It was possible to train in a variety of schools, each
associated with a particular philosophy of medicine. John Pickstone, Medicine, Society, and the
State, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 260, 261 (Roy Porter ed., 2006) [hereinafter
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE]. This Article begins its story after this period because it is not
expressly concerned with providing a history of the practice of medicine in the United States, but
with suggesting some consequences for those engaged in the world of health care of the
transformation of medicine from a cottage industry to big business. Id. at 260-61.
25. This section is indebted generally to Paul Starr's history of American medicine. See PAUL
STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).

26. Pickstone, supra note 24, at 279.
27. Id.
28. JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS: How WE GOT INTO IT
AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT 12-13 (2005).

29.

STARR, supra note 25, at 112-16.
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authority generally, bolstered the development of medicine as a
profession with high status.3 °
By the early twentieth century, doctors' incomes increased
significantly. 3' Furthermore, physicians steadfastly opposed any changes
that would have increased the power of government or private
corporations over the profession.32 Doctors operated to safeguard
professional autonomy and wages. And at least until the end of the
twentieth century, the legal system34 did not interfere with that agenda.33
Sometimes it supported it actively.
As a result, physicians in the United States continued to gain social
influence and significant financial rewards.3 5 Medical authority was both
assumed and venerated.3 6 Yet, while doctors enjoyed prestige and
economic success,3 7 medicine remained a cottage industry,38 largely free
from the involvement of government or corporate rule. The profession
thus enjoyed extraordinary autonomy. 39 The privileged social position of
physicians in the United States encouraged and justified the
development of a hierarchical form of relationship between physician
and patient.40 Thus, during the first three-quarters of the twentieth

30. Id. at 17-29. Starr notes that physicians have not always enjoyed high status and high
income. Even in the contemporary world, some societies have viewed physicians less felicitously
than others. During the years of the Soviet Union, doctors earned less than seventy-five percent of
the average industrial wage earner. Id. at 6.
31. Id. at 143.
32. Id. at 200.
33. The profession was able to ward off government interest in providing health services for
the citizenry (at least until the 1960s). Roosevelt had been interested in including health care as part
of the social security legislation of the 1930s. The strong response of physician professional groups
dissuaded him. Id. at 266-79.
34. For instance, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine prohibited the employment of
doctors (to practice medicine) by corporations. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician
Behavior: Legal Barriersto Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 509 (1988).
35. STARR, supra note 25, at 4-5.
36. Id. at 337.
37. Id. at 5.
38. STEPHEN M. AYRES, Economics of Health Care, in HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE FACTS AND THE CHOICES 117, 132 (John H. Whaley, Jr., Am. Library Ass'n, The Last
Quarter Century: A Guide to the Issues & the Literature, No. 4, 1996).
39. STARR, supranote 25, at 6.
40. See id. at 81. Starr quotes a nineteenth century Hungarian doctor who, arriving in the
United States in the 1870s, expressed surprise at the comparative absence of social distance between
physicians and patients in the United States. Id. at 80-81.
Changes in the economics of medicine by the end of the nineteenth century augmented the
profession's burgeoning prestige. Hospitals were developing from sad holding stations for poor,
sick people into the centerpiece of the medical enterprise. Roy Porter, Hospitals and Surgery, in
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 24, at 176, 209-10. The expense of hospitals in the
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century, physicians enjoyed autonomy within a hierarchical system,
justified by physician expertise and by the expectation that physicians
would focus on patient welfare. Patients in turn were expected to trust,
rely on, and remain loyal to their physicians. 4'
That the medical profession prized its unique status and that it
remained separate, in fact, from the world of the corporate marketplace
until the last decades of the twentieth century were essential to the
profession's own developing sense of identity. In particular, medicine's
perceived separation from the marketplace encouraged forms of
interaction among professionals and between professionals and patients
that resembled interactions in families, churches, and schools rather than
interactions in the marketplace.42 Surely, the portrait of the physician as
compassionate healer and trusted expert rested on wistful romance as
well as fact.43 Yet, that image reflected society's hopes and expectations.
Moreover, in fact, doctors made house calls, developed long-lasting
relationships with patients, and touched them in the course of clinical
care. 4 4 All of this reinforced a view of physicians as kindly, trusted care
givers. In short, social patterns defining the doctor's role as well as
society's vision of the doctor-patient relationship reflected the values of
the home far more than the values of the marketplace.
2. The Commercialization of Medicine
That universe survived, without effective challenge, until the last
decades of the twentieth century, though inklings of change appeared
soon after World War II. In particular, the development of biomedical
technology, laboratory tests, and innovative pharmacological options for

United States was carried by charities, by paying patients, and later by health care insurers and those
who paid for that insurance. Id. at 209; Pickstone, supra note 24, at 282, 287.
The model for American health insurance for most of the twentieth century emerged at
Baylor University Hospital in Texas in 1929. The hospital began to promise specified levels of care
to groups of subscribers (such as teachers) who paid periodic premiums to the hospital. RICHMOND
& FEIN, supra note 28, at 30-31. By the 1940s, the United States had effectively committed itself to

a voluntary insurance system funded by employers. Id. at 36-39.
41. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Evolution of the "Patient": Shifts in Attitude About Consent,
Genetic Information, and Commercialization in Health Care, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 137, 138-39 &
nn.5-6 (2005); see also HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE: THE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING OF MEDICAL CARE 459-60 (1961).
42. See SOMERS & SOMERS, supra note 41, at 458.

43. Id. at 457 (calling the "popular conception of the doctor-patient relationship.., a mixture
of fact and fancy").
44.

See LEWIS THOMAS, THE YOUNGEST SCIENCE: NOTES OF A MEDICINE-WATCHER 55-58

(1983) (observing that ill people need to be touched, and that now, sophisticated diagnostic testing
allows physicians to treat patients from afar).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/11

8

Dolgin: Debating Conflicts: Medicine, Commerce, and Contrasting Ethical O
2006]

MEDICINE, COMMERCE, AND CONTRASTING ETHICAL ORDERS

713

treating a wide set of diseases and physical ills augmented the status, but
altered the character of the physician-patient relationship. 45
Slowly at first and then with increasing certainty, physicians began
to focus less on the patient-as-person and more on innovative therapeutic
procedures and treatments. 4 This shift occurred coterminously with a set
of startling financial and structural shifts in the world of health care.
These developments included, in particular, significant public financing
for health care with the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s,
the purchase of hospitals and nursing homes by corporate chains, and
precipitous increases in the cost of health care that resulted in employers
replacing indemnity insurance with "managed-care" plans. 47 Each of

these fed the others. 48 Through the 1970s, this developing medicalindustrial complex 49 grew alongside the world of independent practicing
doctors. 50

In sum, by the 1970s and early 1980s, the groundwork was being
laid for a broad commercialization of medicine. 5' By the middle of the
1980s, Wall Street investment houses were establishing health care

45. Edward Shorter, PrimaryCare, in CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 24, at
103, 134-35.
46. Id. at 134. Shorter explained:
The whole patient-as-a-person movement fell into desuetude after 1950, replaced by a
new generation of physicians filled with an overweening therapeutic self-confidence.
The aspects of the doctor-patient relationship to which patients had once thrilled, such as
the physician's show of interest in the history-taking or the laying on of hands in the
physical exam, became down-played in favour of using the resources of diagnostic
imaging and of laboratory tests in the diagnosis of disease.
Id.
47. Arnold S. Relman, The Health of Nations: Medicine and the Free Market, NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 7, 2005, at 23, 24-25.
48. So, for instance, as managed care grew, investors became increasingly interested in
putting money into health maintenance organizations, as well as hospitals and nursing homes.
STARR, supra note 25, at 428 (describing the corporate transformation of medicine).
49. The term "medical industrial complex" seems first to have been used by Arnold Relman
in the 1980s. His use of the term was a play on President Eisenhower's notion of a "militaryindustrial complex." Relman, supra note 47, at 24.
50. STARR, supra note 25, at 428-29. Starr describes the emerging medical-industrial complex
of the 1970s as having involved:
[T]he linkages between the doctors, hospitals, and medical schools and the health
insurance companies, drug manufacturers, medical equipment suppliers, and other profitmaking firms. Their interests seemed so closely interlocked that they constituted a single
system, a seamless web of influence, a common front for a particular style, structure, and
distribution of medical care.
Id.
51.

DONALD L. BARTLETT & JAMES B. STEELE, CRITICAL CONDITION: How HEALTH CARE IN

AMERICA BECAME BIG BUSINESS AND BAD MEDICINE 76 (2006).
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groups. 52 That development was supported by the Reagan
administration's focus on market forces in responding to the increasing
cost of health care for the government, in particular, and for society,
generally. 53 Even more, the high cost of health care was framed by
reference to the growing portion of the U.S. population, especially
54
people without insurance, who could afford little or no health care.
By the end of the twentieth century, the process of commercializing
medicine intensified, fostering a clear shift in the parameters of the
physician's task and in the scope of the physician-patient relationship.55
These changes have reshaped the scope and redefined the meaning of the
relationship between physicians and patients; they have undermined the
communal dimensions of relationships among all participants in the
world of health care; and they have altered physicians' assumptions
about their work and its value.5 6 They have shaken physicians' sense of
professional identity, and more seriously, have created discontent and
confusion among physicians and among patients and potential patients.
The Socio-Cultural Parameters of Change in the World of
Health Care: From "Status" to "Contract"
A set of additional factors did not so much cause, as they
facilitated, the transformation of medicine at the end of the twentieth
century. The broad ideological shift from a society that had long viewed
itself as composed of separate social domains-those defined in terms of
status and those defined in terms of contract-began to reshape the
world of health care and medicine.57 Slowly, the presumptions that
undergirded the world of the marketplace began routinely to shape
relationships in those social domains once shaped through presumptions
that contrasted with those operative in the marketplace. That widespread
social shift was essential to the particular transformation of medicine
from a profession grounded in hierarchically structured relations of trust,
dependence, and loyalty to one defined in marketplace terms.
3.

52. Id. at 76-78.
53. Id. at 88.
54. STARR,supra note 25, at 381-82.
55. See id. at 428 (noting that by the early 1980s the medical profession was "in the early
stages of a major transformation").
56. See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel, Commentary, How Did We Get into This Mess, in CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 142,
143-49 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter CONFLICTS OF INTEREST] (discussing possible

reasons for the pharmaceutical industry's influence over physicians).
57. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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Although the transformation of medicine in the last decades of the
twentieth century resembles the transformation of families, medicine,
unlike families, was always connected openly to the world of
commerce. 58 Medicine, however, was unusual among the professions, in
that society viewed medicine as a domain that valued, and even
depended upon, many of the social forms that characterized the
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century family. Doctors, for instance,
expected patients to respect their conclusions, to follow their advice, and
to remain loyal.59 Patients rarely disagreed with that vision of the
physician-patient relationship. Before the last few decades of the
twentieth century, neither doctor nor patient viewed patients as equal
partners in the healing relationships; patients had no particular right to,
and were not necessarily considered well served by knowing, the details
of their illnesses or treatment options.6 °
That physicians until quite recently, almost uniquely among the
professions, defined themselves in opposition to large commercial and
bureaucratic interests, provided support for doctors' participation in a
universe that defined the physician-patient relationship through the terms
of status rather than those of contract. 61 Arnold Relman, a former editor58. Families have a myriad of financial dimensions also. However, since the industrial
revolution, families have been viewed in contrast to the world of work. Thus, the claims here are
about cultural perspectives and ideology more than they are about the actual relevance of commerce
to any set of social relationships. See supra note 2 (defining ideology as used here).
59. See Dolgin, supranote 41, at 140 & n. 15; SOMERS & SOMERS, supra note 41, at 459-60.
60. The term "informed consent" (regarding a patient's ight to information about diagnosis
and care) may have first been used by a court in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 317 P.2d 170,
181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). Salgo represents a transitional decision. On the one hand, the court
explained that a "physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he
withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to
the proposed treatment." Id. On the other hand, the court noted the doctor's "discretion" not to
reveal information "consistent, of course, with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed
consent." Id.
Fifteen years after Salgo, a federal court in Washington, D.C. offered a far broader and
more certain rule. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Canterbury, the court
proclaimed physicians potentially liable for failing to reveal "material" information to a patient and
proposed assessing materiality with reference to the judgment of a reasonably prudent person. Id. at
786-87. See also Dolgin, supra note 41, at 150-64 (considering shifts in patient-doctor relationship
with reference to legal construction of the informed consent doctrine).
61. See STARR, supra note 25, at 25. Paul Starr explains:
[I]n the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, doctors were able to reverse the
history that other occupations experienced. While many skilled crafts were losing
monopoly power, the physicians were establishing theirs. In the same period as the crafts
were being subordinated to large corporations, the medical profession was
institutionalizing its autonomy. The doctors escaped becoming victims of capitalism and
became small capitalists instead.
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in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, described health care
in the United States in the early 1960s:
[At that time] medical care in the United States consisted mostly of
personal transactions between physicians and patients, which took
place in patients' homes, doctors' offices, or not-for profit hospitals
and clinics. Only a few of these transactions involved expensive
physicians
technology or highly specialized facilities, and primary-care
62
could spend the necessary time with their patients.
At least in part, that system served physicians and, to a significant
extent, it served many patients. Doctors were paid respect, often
virtually homage, not only by patients, but by the social worlds in which
they lived. They felt special; their work was deemed highly meaningful,
their expertise was prized,63 they were paid well, they enjoyed
professional autonomy, 64 and they were appreciated and trusted by
65
patients. Patients, in their turn, benefited from the comfort provided by
their trust in and loyalty to their doctors. That was not only satisfying per
se; it could promote healing.66
The collapse of that universe was a product of a variety of
economic and political forces. In addition, it was facilitated by the
general abandonment of "traditional" values in those domains of social
life that had been defined in contrast to the marketplace. By the last
decades of the twentieth century, medicine was being shaped by
managed care and by increased government regulation. Commenting on
the corporatization of medicine in the second half of the twentieth
century, Paul Starr wrote:
Although physicians and voluntary hospitals have been preoccupied
with government regulation, they may be on their way to losing their

62. Relman, supra note 47, at 23.
63. See Kenneth Kipnis, Ethical Conflict in CorrectionalHealth Services, in CONFLICT OF
INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS 302, 306 (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds., 2001) [hereinafter
CONFLICT IN THE PROFESSIONS] (noting that health care professionals' "distinctive knowledge"
justifies that societies license them and grant them "exclusive responsibility to deliver their
distinctive services to the community").
64. BARLETr & STEELE, supra note 51, at 163 (noting that decisions about patient care, once
left to physicians alone, are now determined by cost considerations voiced by third-party payers).
65. Cf Ubel, supra note 56, at 147-48, 150 (speculating that physicians may be "interacting
with industry" because industry makes them "feel special" in a world in which their income is
shrinking or appears to be threatened by managed care companies and other third-party payers and
they are beset with a variety of unfamiliar pressures).
66. Kipnis, supra note 63, at 306 (noting generally and with specific reference to patients in
correctional facilities that patients' trust in health care professionals "is an indispensable element of
the 'therapeutic alliance').
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autonomy to another master. Medical care in America now appears to
be in the early stages of a major transformation in its institutional
structure, comparable to the rise of professional sovereignty at the
opening of the twentieth century. Corporations have begun to integrate
a hitherto decentralized hospital system, enter a variety of other health
care businesses, and consolidate ownership and control in what may
eventually become
an industry dominated by huge health care
67
conglomerates.

As industry has more fully encompassed and reshaped the world of
medicine, medicine has begun to lose its status as an independent
profession.6 8 The consequences have been momentous for physicians
and patients. And the journey has been uncomfortable for both groups.69
III.

DEBATING ACROSS AN IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE: MEDICINE AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

This Part of the Article traces the socio-cultural implications of the
transformation occurring within the world of health care by analyzing
contrasting views about links between medicine and industry,7 ° as well
as different understandings of how best to respond to such links.
Inevitably, this discussion implicates a far broader consideration of
medicine's identity and scope.
Debate among physicians about the parameters of medicine is now
occurring across an ideological divide. That divide reflects the more
general ideological divide in American culture regarding the expansion
of autonomous individuality to domains of life once grounded in status.7 1

67. Starr, supra note 25, at 428.
68. See Scott Y.H. Kim, Commentary, Financial Conflicts of Interest and the Identity of
Academic Medicine, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 56, at 181, 183-85.
69. See, e.g., Amy L. Cralam, The Serpent in the Garden of Eden: A Look at the Impact of
Physician FinancialIncentive Programsand a Reconsideration of Herdrich v. Pegram, 16 J.L. &
HEALTH 289 (2001-2002). Cralam notes the use of financial incentives by HMOs to "reduce the
amount of care subject to insurance reimbursement" and the resultant costs to the patient. Id. at 291
(citing Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician FinancialIncentives, 281 JAMA
1424 (1999)). "[M]any of the methods of cost-containment commonly used are found to be ethically
objectionable by physicians themselves." Id. at 291-92 (citing Daniel P. Sulmasy et al., Physicians'
Ethical Beliefs About Cost-ControlArrangements, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 649 (2000)).
That conclusion was based on a survey of 1549 physicians, queried about their satisfaction with
their work. Id. at 292 n. 11.
70. This Article focuses on links between physicians and industry, but much of what it reports
also applies to links between non-physician biomedical researchers and industry.
71. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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ContrastingVisions of ProfessionalIdentity

Categorized as a "profession," medicine in the United States has
long been connected openly to commerce, but it was also viewed by
physicians and by society as a domain that prized, and even depended
upon, many of the status-based assumptions about personhood and about
relationships that characterized the nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury family rather than those deemed appropriate to the
marketplace. 72
1. Old Options and New Ones
As those assumptions have been challenged within U.S. society
generally, they have been challenged as well within the world of
medicine. At present, medicine is a world in transition. Physicians
disagree among themselves, in a way they did not throughout most of
the twentieth century, about their professional identity and about the
scope of medicine. In consequence, some physicians are confused by the
pressures that inevitably attend transition; some are discontented; and
some have joined forces with the marketplace and have, in effect, begun
to redefine medicine from within.73
Among other things, doctors have become disgruntled with shifts in
the character of the doctor-patient relationship and with new financial
pressures. Peter Ubel, himself a physician, has attempted to "look[] in
physicians' heads ' 7 4 as the character of their profession changes-as old
assumptions about medical practice are challenged by a new reality. In
Ubel's view, physicians are forging links with industry because industry
does what medicine once did for them but often no longer does: It makes
them feel good about themselves.75 Ubel suggests, among other things,
that industry makes physicians feel more satisfied with themselves and
their work than does the practice of medicine absent links to industry.76

72.

See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.

73. See Ubel, supra note 56, at 149 (discussing prevalence of relationship between physicians
and pharmaceutical industry).
74. Id. at 150.
75. See id. at 148.
76. Id. In particular, Ubel focuses on academic physicians, but much of what he describes
applies as well to practicing doctors. Ubel wrote: "[I]ndustry simply knows how to make
beleaguered academic physicians feel special again." Id.
Ubel also notes the effect on doctors of falling incomes. Practicing doctors, he asserts,
have faced falling incomes as a result of restrictions imposed by managed care companies and other
third party payers. See id. Academic doctors have been pressured to "find ways to pay for every
minute of their time." Id. In that context, the lure presented by industry has often been compelling:
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Ubel here implicitly suggests a peculiar comparison between physicians'
satisfaction in the world of community (home and medicine) three or
more decades ago and their satisfaction now in the world of the
marketplace. Doctors were contented with the satisfactions offeredespecially to those at the top of the social hierarchy-by a world defined
through the metaphors of home, rather than those of the marketplace.
But once deprived of traditional professional satisfactions, some of them
have begun to yearn for the revivification of traditional modes of
practicing medicine." Some have switched frames of reference and
begun to define themselves as full participants in the world of the
marketplace-a world that the profession once openly and consistently
rejected.78 And still others remain confused.
2. Physicians Face New Forms of Conflicting Interests
Even when medicine was a cottage industry, physicians faced
conflicts of interest. However, the conflicts they face today are
significantly different than those they faced a half century ago. The most
pervasive conflict of interest that faced practicing physicians within the
world of traditional medicine was part and parcel of the doctoring role:
Doctors were paid when they provided treatment; the more treatment
they provided, the more they were paid. 79 That conflict of interest
developed from within the physician-patient relationship.8 ° Physicians
Industry can be a source of relatively easy money for physicians. Industry pays
physicians well to enroll patients into clinical trials-more than covering the cost of
enrolling the patients. Industry funds grants with much less rigorous peer review and
much faster turnaround time than federal funding agencies.
Id.
77. Arnold Relman, a former editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine,
suggested in the mid-1980s that "[t]here can be no really satisfactory solution [to the problems
besetting the American health care system] until the medical profession itself faces up to the threat
of entrepreneurialism and decides to take a firm stand in defense of professional ethics." Arnold S.
Relman, Editorial, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 749, 750 (1985).
78. See Ubel, supranote 56, 142, 148-50; see also Timothy J. Mullaney, Special Report, This
Man Wants to Heal Health Care, BUS. WK., Oct. 31, 2005, at 74, 75. Mullaney's piece describes the
efforts of Dr. David J. Brailer to revamp American health care on the model of United States
manufacturing. In particular, Dr. Brailer proposes providing each person in the United States with
an electronic record of his or her health care history and then linking all of the records into what he
calls the National Health Information Network Inc. Mullaney explains that Dr. Brailer "believes
in... an even more capitalistic version of American medicine than today's system." Mullaney,
supra,at 77.
79. Stephen R. Latham, Conflict of Interest in Medical Practice, in CONFLICT IN THE
PROFESSIONS, supra note 63, at 279, 285.
80. See Andrew Stark, Why Are (Some) Conflicts of Interest in Medicine So Uniquely
Vexing?, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 56, at 152, 154. Stark quotes Arnold Relman who
concluded that .'professional ambition in medical scientists, whatever its danger, has a redeeming
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also encountered financial conflicts that were not inherent to the
doctoring task,81 such as "fee-splitting" arrangements.8 2 The practice was
endemic to American medicine since the last decades of the nineteenth
century.83 Although it was condemned by the American Medical
Association, professional countermeasures were routinely lax.8 4 Even
more troubling, the profession viewed the practice as comparatively
benign when compared with "serious" ethical violations such as
"stealing" a colleague's patients.8 5
Both fee-splitting and "stealing" other doctors' patients, however
unpleasant and unethical, differ from financial conflicts of interest
created by collaboration with industry mostly in that they challenged the
morality of the profession but not the socio-cultural parameters that
fashioned its essential identity. By focusing on physicians'
contemporary responses-both public and professional-to the debate
about forging financial links with industry, the next section considers
this difference in more detail.
B. New Conflicts of Interest-Links with Industry
In the last several decades, many academic physicians and
practicing doctors have accepted gifts and have entered into other
financially valuable relationships with industry. 86 Yet the number of
those willing openly to criticize those links far outweighs the number

social value absent from the pursuit of' private external interests." Id. (quoting Arnold S.Relman,
Editorial, Economic Incentives in Clinical Investigation, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 933, 934 (1989)).
81. Clearly, the conflict described is "inherent" to the doctoring task only because health care
was paid for through fees for service. Other arrangements exist and create other sorts of conflicts.
82. See Marc A. Rodwin, The Organized American Medical Profession's Response to
FinancialConflicts ofInterest: 1890-1992, 70 MILBANK Q. 703,704 (1992).
83. Id. at 709.
84. Id. at 704 (noting that "the AMA first ignored fee splitting.... then denounced [it], but
was never able effectively to enforce its policies" about the matter).
85. Id. at 713.
86. For example, many physicians work as consultants and "pseudoconsultants" for industry.
JEROME P. KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: HOW MEDICINE'S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN
ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH 13 (2005) [hereinafter KASSiRER, ON THE TAKE]. Dr. Kassirer defines

pseudoconsultants as doctors who, for a fee, attended industry sponsored events and meals. Id.
Industry also pays practicing physicians, often significant amounts, to enroll patients in clinical
trials. Id. at 9; see also LEONARD J. WEBER, PROFITS BEFORE PEOPLE?: ETHICAL STANDARDS AND

THE MARKETING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 46-47 (2006). Pharmaceutical representatives visit the
offices of practicing physicians, leaving behind small gifts, drug samples, and free meals.
KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE, supra at 7-8, 10; WEBER, supra, at 43-44. In addition, industry provides
significant funding toward continuing medical education programs. KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE, supra
at 8-9, 14-17; WEBER, supra, at 46.
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ready openly to justify them.87 Open support for links to industry has
been less public, but it does exist. It is found, among other places, in
letters to editors of professional journals 88 and sometimes even in
"opinion" pieces in popular media. 89 This section summarizes both sets
of responses to such links between physicians and industry.
1. Physicians Comment on Links to Industry
Recent books by the last two editors of the New England Journalof
Medicine suggest the character of the charge against physicians
collaborating with pharmaceutical companies. Marcia Angell's book,
The Truth About the Drug Companies9" depicts the pharmaceutical
industry as "primarily a marketing machine to sell drugs of dubious
benefit." 9 1 Dr. Kassirer, who preceded Angell at the journal, strongly
opposes most financial links between physicians and industry. He
characterizes present-day medical conferences as elaborate advertising
extravaganza for industry's products: "Scores of beautiful men and
women from pharmaceutical, biotechnology, device, and book
companies greet the doctors wandering through the hall, where
enormous, expensive artistic creations announce the successes of the
companies' drugs with lights, sound, food and electronic wizardry. 9 2
Dr. Kassirer recommends that physicians turn down all industry gifts,
that they refuse to participate in drug marketing, and that they be
precluded from giving lectures or publishing articles "if they have a
financial relation to a company that makes a product mentioned in the
lecture or the manuscript., 93 In Dr. Kassirer's view, physicians who
receive financial benefits as a result of links to industry jettison the
87. See, e.g., JOHN ABRAMSON, OVERDOSED AMERICA: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 120-21 (2004); MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 115-34 (2004); JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL
MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 292-94 (2004); KASSIRER,
ON THE TAKE, supra note 86 (discussing in depth the consequences of physicians' financial ties to
the pharmaceutical industry); Jerome P. Kassirer, Physicians' Financial Ties with the
PharmaceuticalIndustry: A Critical Element of a FormidableMarketing Network, in CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST, supra note 56, at 133 [hereinafter Kassirer, Financial Ties]; Jerome P. Kassirer & Marcia
Angell, Editorial, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED.
570 (1993); Arnold S.Relman & Marcia Angell, America's Other Drug Problem, NEW REPUBLIC,
Dec. 16, 2002, at 27.
88. See infra notes 101, 119, 121 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 118, 120 and accompanying text.
90. ANGELL, supra note 87. In the book's preface, Angell explains the purpose of the book is
to "expose the real pharmaceutical industry." Id. at xvii.
91. Id. at xviii.
92. KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE, supra note 86, at 2.
93. Kassirer, Financial Ties, supra note 87, at 140.
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values of a profession that once prized, and that should continue to prize,
caring and trust above financial opportunities.94
Similarly, John Abramson,9 5 a family doctor and clinical professor
of medicine, worries that drug marketing and exaggerated promises
about sophisticated technology can lead to the "erosion of the healing
alliance between doctors and patients. 96 Again and again, Abramson's
book, Overdosed America, laments physicians' financial links with
industry, and suggests that
those links threaten to undermine physicians'
97
patients.
to
commitment
The shared worry of these authors, and others sounding a
concordant note,98 is that the integrity of research on which medicine is
grounded and the character of the relationship between physician and
patient-which they deem central to the actualization of medicine's
deepest promises-are weakened by physicians being cajoled or openly
choosing to assist in securing industry's bottom line. In some imagined
future time, these critics suggest, the commercialization of medicine
could even eviscerate the doctor-patient relationship completely by
doing away with the need for doctors. 99
In contrast, those favoring links between physicians and industry
presume that the relationship between the two makes doctors more
competent by helping them to take advantage of industry's
innovations.'0 0 Among this group, responses range from surprise that
anyone assumes physicians might act unethically,1 ° ' to outrage at a
"witch hunt against supposed conflicts of interest in scientific and

94. Id. at 139.
95. See generally John Abramson, The Reliability of Our Medical Knowledge As a Product of
Industry Relationships, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (2006) (discussing the transformative effect of
commercial funding on academic medical research).
96.

ABRAMSON, supranote 87, at 11.

97. See, e.g., id. at 120-24 (noting that pharmaceutical funding for continuing medical
education skews physicians' judgment about which drugs to prescribe); id. at 241 (noting a time
"when breakthroughs in medical science were driven more by health needs than by the search for
corporate profits").
98. See generally AVORN, supra note 87 (discussing the influence of pharmaceutical
representatives and other industry relationships on physician's prescribing habits).
99. Id. at 408-10 (imagining a future day in which patients will "directly access decisionsupport software on the world wide web to decide which drugs they need, and then use the internet
to purchase those drugs directly"); see also infra Part IV (suggesting that medicine may split into
two separate professional groups).
100. See infra notes 109-10, 114, 118 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Rick Robertson, Letter to the Editor, My Sentiments Exactly, FAM. PRAC. NEWS,
Apr. 15, 2006, at 12, available at http://download.joumals.elsevierhealth.com/pdfs/joumals/03007073/PlIS0300707306729929.pdf.
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'0 2 This group of commentators strongly favors
medical research."'
financial collaboration between industry and academic physicians,
generally highlights the promise of new biotechnological and
pharmaceutical products, and downplays the risk of physician-researcher
bias.' °3
In supporting financial links between industry and practicing
doctors, they focus especially on a variety of advantages that may flow
to busy doctors and their patients from doctors' connections to
industry.1°4 In addition, a few commentators have suggested (usually
implicitly and somewhat defensively) that industry's gifts and honoraria
barely counterbalance physicians' falling incomes,'0 5 and that to criticize
with industry is to further
doctors for entering into agreements
10 6
undermine a beleaguered profession.
Thomas Stossel, 0 7 a medical school professor, is unusual among
academic physicians in publicly and vociferously debunking the
assertions of "prominent authorities" whom he views as having
"influenced policy" in "claiming that medicine and medical science are
deteriorating in a morass of commercialism."' 0 8 Stossel argues, in
contrast to those he criticizes, that industry support for university and

102. Thomas Stossel & David Shaywitz, What's Wrong With Money in Science?, WASH. POST,
July 2, 2006, at B3; see also David A. Shaywitz, Op-Ed., Science and Shams, BOSTON GLOBE, July
27, 2006, at All (referring to "[t]he national preoccupation with university researchers who
collaborate with drug companies" as a "full-fledged witch hunt").
103. Stossel & Shaywitz, supra note 102. Stossel and Shaywitz report that private
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies have conducted "cutting-edge medical research" that
has led to "huge advances in medical treatment, including powerful new hormones and anti-cancer
drugs as well as new devices that repair heart damage." Id.
104. See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
105. Kenneth Webster, Letter to the Editor, Don't OverregulateHealth Care, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Fla.), Jan. 30, 2006, at IOA. The writer is identified as the executive director of the Pinellas
County Osteopathic Medical Society in Palm Harbor, Florida. The writer notes that cuts in
Medicare payments and other government rules are making it difficult to continue to practice
medicine. Id.
106. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (noting Peter Ubel's conclusion that
physicians turn to industry at least in part because industry makes them feel satisfied and productive
in a way that medicine once did but no longer does).
107. Thomas P. Stossel, Am. Cancer Soc'y Professor, Harvard Med. Sch., Regulating
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Medicine: A Solution in Search of a Problem, Speech at the
Hofstra University School of Law and the Hofstra Cultural Center Symposium: Biomedical
Research and the Law (Oct. 4, 2006) (discussing the lack of adverse effects stemming from
interaction between physicians and industry).
108. Thomas P. Stossel, Regulating Academic-Industrial Research Relationships-Solving
Problems or Stifling Progress?,353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1060, 1063 (2005). Among the "prominent
authorities" whom Stossel cites are Derek Bok, Marcia Angell, Jerome Kassirer, and Arnold
Relman. Id. at 1065 nn.33-36.
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government biomedical researchers facilitates the development of
sophisticated biotechnology and the improvement of medical care: 109
[R]esearch is not done for free. To fund their work, university
investigators obey the whims of nonprofit as well as commercial
sponsors. University and governmental rules that prevent wide-ranging
interactions between academic researchers and industry limit creative
and economic opportunities and are a far greater violation
0 of academic
freedom than any documented interference by industry."
Stossel's perspective suggests that medicine, at least in its academic
guise, should be part of a larger industrial complex. He laments the
"antibusiness attitude" of authorities on whom, in his view, the press,
and thus presumably the public, tend to rely,"' and he disagrees with
those who suggest that advances in medicine in the past forty years can
be attributed to "high professional standards of physicians or their
aversion to commercialism." '" 2 That view, Stossel concludes, is
backwards. In contrast, he argues that commercialism should not be
identified as the villain." 13 Rather, Stossel suggests, commercialism has
served medicine as well as those whom medicine serves:4 "It is only
11
industry [that] has delivered these products to the public.",
Dr. David Shaywitz, another physician who favors links with
industry, has challenged the notion that "university researchers" should
be asked to adhere to a moral order different from that pertaining to
"business people." 15 In this context, Dr. Shaywitz suggests, at least
implicitly, that biomedical researchers work within the marketplace, and
should thus be directed by the ethical rules of the marketplace." 16

109. Stossel & Shaywitz, supra note 102; Stossel, supra note 108, at 1060.
110. Stossel, supra note 108, at 1062 (considering the implications of industry funding in light
of academic freedom).
Il1. Id. at 1063.
112. Talk of the Nation: Science Friday: Conflicts ofInterest at the Doctor's Office (Nat'l Pub.
Radio broadcast Sept. 1, 2006) [hereinafter NPR, Conflicts] (discussing physician-industry conflicts
of interest with host Ira Flatow and guests Dr. Ezekiel Emanuel, Dr. Sanford Friedman, Dr. Jerome
Kassirer, and Dr. Thomas Stossel);
see also Stossel & Shaywitz, supra note 102
("Little... technology-be it vaccines for hepatitis, heart valves, or new anti-inflammatory drugs
for rheumatoid arthritis-was developed by scholars and researchers without supposed conflicts of
interest.").
113. See NPR, Conflicts, supra note 112; Stossel, supra note 108, at 1063-64 (noting that
commercialism allows academic investors to bring their products to market by involving
entrepreneurial investors, whose financial contributions help alleviate the high risk of failure).
114. NPR, Conflicts, supra note 112.
115. Shaywitz, supra note 102.
116. See id. (implying that conflict of interest rules discourage collaboration between
university researchers and industry, and ultimately slow the pace of medical progress).
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Others favoring financial links between practicing doctors and
industry have written letters to various newspapers and professional
journals questioning the judgment and motives of those who suggest
7
limiting or precluding industry's gifts to and support for doctors." 1 One
letter writer, for instance, who applauds the "free enterprise system,"
opines that those decrying industry's relationship with practicing doctors
are simultaneously interfering with industry's capacity to make
"innovations" available to patients and impugning the capacity of
drug information provided by pharmaceutical
doctors to interpret
8
'
1
companies.
Other letters to editors suggest that doctors have become the
scapegoats for government's inability to contain the high cost of
drugs; 1 9 that physicians, beset with declining incomes and increasing
time constraints, yet ready to lecture at continuing medical education
conferences, should not also be deprived of industry-funded
honoraria; 2 ° and that anger should and would be more appropriately
projected at "bureaucrats, insurance companies, and legislators ... who
really run medicine," than at practicing physicians who merely accept
pens and free dinners.' 2' Others note that industry supplies busy
physicians with information about new drugs and new uses for old drugs
that they might not otherwise obtain. 22 And still others contend simply
that physicians in private practice, much as business people, are not
to resist biases that
likely to act irresponsibly, and should thus be 1trusted
23
industry.
with
links
might flow from financial
2. Assumptions Behind Contrasting Views of Links to Industry
Behind these contrasting sets of assertions about financial links
between physicians and industry lie two distinct sets of assumptions
117. See supra notes 101-02, 105 and accompanying text; infra notes 118-19 and
accompanying text.
118. Bill Reading, Letter to the Editor, Gifts for Doctors Shouldn't Erode Our Faith in Health
Care, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Jan. 30, 2006, at 1OA.
119. Matt Beckwith, Letter to the Editor, Don 't Blame the Pharm Reps, OB. GYN. NEWS, Mar.
15, 2006, at 6. The letter writer, identified as a physician, describes Medicare Part D, which
precludes governments negotiating with drug companies as "the sellout of the decade." Id.
120. Webster, supra note 105.
121. R. Brian Barber, Letter to the Editor, Prescription: 'A Dose of Reality', OB. GYN. NEWS,
Mar. 15, 2006, at 6. The writer, identified as a physician, challenges those who oppose links
between physicians and industry to show him "a single study that says the [doctor] who goes to a
free dinner with his family wrote prescriptions for inferior drugs and hurt his patients in a
significant way." Id.
122. Ubel, supranote 56, at 143; Webster, supra note 105.
123. See Robertson, supra note 101.
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about medicine more generally. Those wary of or openly opposed to
physicians collaborating with industry share one broad set of
assumptions about the ideals of the medical profession. Broadly this
group avows that medicine-as a matter of both morality and
professional efficacy-should focus primarily on the healing
relationship and, further, that that focus will inevitably be blurred by
physicians forging financial links with industry. 124 In contrast, the
position of those who would provide for or even encourage financial
links with industry is grounded in a different set of assumptions-that
medicine will benefit by participating actively in developments that can
be actualized only with industry's support; that medicine should not
remain anchored to images shaped when medicine was a cottage
industry; and that physicians, much as investment bankers and
accountants, can function best by becoming full participants in the
commercial marketplace. 125 To the extent that those on each side of the
ideological divide fail to take account of such contrasting assumptions,
discourse across the divide is, and will continue to be, stymied.
C.

What's an "Ethical" Response?: The Example of DisclosureRules

Such contrasting assumptions support different responses to
conflicts of interest created by physicians' financial links to industry.
This section examines assumptions behind contrasting positions about
disclosure rules as an antidote to bias.
1. Are Disclosure Rules Enough?
126
Disclosure rules are minimally disruptive to ongoing practice,
and, perhaps for that reason, are among the most popular responses to

124. See, e.g., supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
126. See WEBER, supra note 86, at 60 (suggesting that disclosure is "simply ... a warning that
the risk [of bias] exists"). In addition to disclosure rules, rules that might be relied on to protect
against bias in conflict of interest situations include: divestiture; the related remedy, recusal; and the
imposition of legal penalties for behavior deemed unethical. See Daylian M. Cain et al., Coming
Clean but Playing Dirtier: The Shortcomings of Disclosure as a Solution to Conflicts of Interest, in
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 56, at 104, 107-08 (indicating that, as compared with these
other rules, disclosure is a less intrusive way of dealing with conflicts). In the context of academic
medicine, divestiture and recusal rules would, for instance, require an academic physician who
owns stock in a company that produces drugs relevant to the physician's research either to sell the
stock (divestiture) or discontinue engaging in the research (recusal). See Stark, supra note 80, at
155-56. Practicing physicians could be required to refuse gifts and other funds offered to them by
industry. In contrast, disclosure obligations require only that the relevant conflict of interest be
made public. Id. at 156.
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industry. 127
conflicts of interest created by physicians' financial links to
Rules requiring disclosure have been proposed, encouraged, or
journals, 28 government agencies, 129 and
implemented by medical
130
professional associations.
a.

The Growing Place for Disclosure Rules

Despite general agreement about the need to disclose conflicts of
interest, not all commentators view disclosure rules in the same way.
Some see them as necessary and sufficient to preclude the risk that
financial conflicts of interest create bias.' 31 Others deem them necessary
role
but not sufficient. 32 Different assumptions about the physician's
133
groups.
two
the
separate
generally
more
and about medicine
Disclosure rules are increasingly required of academic physicians
with financial links to industry, including physicians who receive
research funds, consulting fees, or other benefits from industry. Many
medical journals have instituted disclosure rules, 134 and medical lecturers
are asked to disclose links to companies producing drugs or other
127. See Cain et al., supra note 126, at 107-08; infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
128. Dr. Catherine D. De Angelis, the editor-in-chief of The Journal of the American Medical
Association asks authors to sign statements in which they outline possible conflicts they may have.
Donald G. McNeil Jr., Tough-Talking JournalEditor FacesAccusations of Leniency, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2006, at DI; see also WEBER, supra note 86, at 128; Catherine De Angelis et al., Editorial,
Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement from the International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1250, 1250 (requiring that potential authors register clinical trials in
public trials registry as a prerequisite for consideration of publication by member journals).
129. Among other things, rules put into effect by the National Institutes of Health in 2005
required senior officials to complete disclosure forms revealing various connections to industry,
including their outside financial holdings. Jeffrey Young, Complaints About NIH Ethics Rules
Dwindle, HILL, Apr. 27, 2006, at 20. About 6000 to 7000 NIH employees filed the forms in 2005.
Id.
130. The updated Standards adopted by the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical
Education (approved in 2004, effective in 2005) provide that those with authority to dictate the
content of continuing medical education must disclose "all relevant financial relationships with any
commercial interest." STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL SUPPORT: STANDARDS TO ENSURE THE
INDEPENDENCE OF CME ACTIVITIES para. 2.1 (Accreditation Council for Continuing Med. Educ.
2004), available at http://www.accme.org; see also WEBER, supra note 86, at 109-10.
131. See Stossel, supra note 108, at 1064; Shaywitz, supra note 102; Kevin W. Williams,
Managing Physician Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials Conducted in the Private
PracticeSetting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 70 (2004).
132. See Jerome P. Kassirer, Op-Ed., A Cure For Public Distrust, BOSTON GLOBE, July 27,
2006, at A I I [hereinafter Kassirer, PublicDistrust].
133. See infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text. Moreover, some commentators support
disclosure rules for physician-researchers but would prefer that practicing doctors limit or forego
collaboration with industry (thus largely precluding the need for disclosure).
134. Jerome P. Kassirer, FinancialConflict of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical Frontier, 27
AM. J.L. & MED. 149,153-54 (2001).
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products about which they will lecture.' 35 In 2005, the Executive
Council of the Association of the American Medical Colleges,
representing the academic medical community, recommended that
medical researchers disclose financial interests and that the results of
clinical trials be made available to the public within a year and a half of
submission for publication. 136 Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry,
under social and legal pressure, has
agreed to use the Internet to publish
37
information about clinical trials. 1
Disclosure has not generally been required of practicing physicians
who receive gifts (including drug samples) from industry; 138 however, a
number of commentators have begun to suggest that practicing doctors
who enroll patients in drug studies funded by industry should be
required to reveal financial conflicts of interest to patients who agree to
139
participate in such studies.
b.

The Assumption Behind Disclosure Rules

Broadly, disclosure rules are grounded on the assumption that
people (patients, clients, and buyers) can make sensible choices and
protect their interests if they are aware that those with whom they are
dealing have financial conflicts of interest. 140 However, a group of
theorists suggest that this assumption and the rules that rest on it may be
misplaced.14 1 Indeed, the conclusion that disclosure is effective as a

135.
136.

WEBER, supra note 86, at 107.
PRINCIPLES FOR PROTECTING INTEGRITY IN THE CONDUCT AND REPORTING OF CLINICAL

TRIALS 3, 5 (Ass'n Am. Med. Coils., Susan Ehringhaus & David Kom eds., 2006), available at
http://www.aamc.org/research/clinicaltrialsreporting/clinicaltrialsreporting.pdf; see also Gina Shaw,
AAMC Executive Council Adopts Principlesfor Integrity in Clinical Trials, AAMC REPORTER,
Nov. 2005, availableat http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/nov05/principles.htm.
137. Barry Meier, Drug Industry PlansRelease of More DataAbout Studies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 2005, at C4. Apparently, industry's readiness to effect a voluntary code asking for disclosure was
motivated at least in part by its concern about more burdensome legislation from governments. Id.
That concern was made real when New York State's Attorney General sued GlaxoSmithKline for
hiding information about the use of Paxil by children. Jamie Talan, Suit Settlement: Glaxo to Reveal
Drug Trial Results, NEWSDAY, Aug. 27, 2004, at A4. The case was settled, with the company
agreeing to pay $2.5 million and to publish summaries of drug trials in a registry. Id.
138. Interestingly, most practicing physicians seem to believe that they are not vulnerable to
industry influence, even when they accept gifts and other funding from industry. See Ubel, supra
note 56, at 143-45. Dr. Ubel writes that physicians told him that they appreciate industry's
informing them about new products, and that they are unconcerned about self-serving conduct
"because they are convinced that their knowledge of the medical literature makes them impervious
to industry influence." Id. at 143.
139. See Williams, supra note 131, at 70.
140. Id. at 70,71.
141. See, e.g., id.; Kassirer, Public Distrust,supra note 132.
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practical matter may be misplaced. 142 People tend to be influenced by
suggestions and recommendations even when they know that those
making them have financial conflicts of interest. 143 In addition, those
disclosing financial conflicts of interest may be less likely to correct for
bias produced by the conflicting interests than those not disclosing such
conflicts. 144 Those disclosing conflicts may be motivated to "make up
for" the chance that disclosure will undermine their position. 145 In
addition, knowledge of having disclosed a conflicting interest may create
a sense of "moral license."' 146 Even more, increased bias due to
conflicting interests may be more weighty than increased discounting of
advice by those who are informed that someone with whom they are
dealing has a financial conflict of interest. 4 7 Despite these limitations142. In late 2006, Stanford University Medical Center instituted a policy that precluded its
physicians from receiving even small gifts such as pens, ended the medical center's practice of
accepting meals paid for by industry, and prohibited the center's physicians from signing their
names to articles ghost-written by industry employees. Andrew Pollack, Stanford to Ban Drug
Makers' Gifts to Doctors, Even Pens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2006, at C2. Yale and the University of
Pennsylvania already had such policies in place. Id.
143. Cain et al., supra note 126, at 108-14. The authors asked a group of students, serving as
research subjects, to estimate the population of the United States. Subjects were given an "anchor
value" that was too high or too low. Subjects receiving high values were told that those offering the
information were motivated to have subjects provide "an answer that was artificially high." Id. at
I11.Those given low values were informed that those giving the information were motivated to
have subjects provide an answer that was artificially low. Other subjects were given random values
and were given a "boilerplate" disclosure (e.g., those giving the information may "have been trying
to get you to answer one way or another"). Id.The authors found that despite the disclosures,
subjects "overall test scores were driven largely by the anchor suggested to them." Id. Other studies
have found that people confuse recognition of a fact with the truth of the fact. Id. at 112. Thus,
people are more likely to believe information they hear often. Id. (citation omitted).
144. Id. at 114-16.
145. Some analysts call this "strategic exaggeration." Id. at 115.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 116. The authors conclude only that disclosure does not necessarily obviate biases
created because of conflicts of interest. They explain:
From context to context, whether disclosure does more harm than good depends on the
balance between the discounting it stimulates compared with the "disclosure distortion"
(i.e., the distorting influence disclosure has on advice given) it induces. Rather than show
that disclosures always exacerbate the problems created by conflicts of interest, our goal
has been to argue that disclosure cannot be assumed to always help.
Id. at 117.
Despite limitations in the effectiveness of disclosure at limiting bias, disclosure rules
operate widely in the corporate universe as presumptive safeguards against bias. See, e.g., Eric W.
Orts, Conflict of Interest on CorporateBoards, in CONFLICT INTHE PROFESSIONS, supra note 63, at
129, 129 (noting that traditional rules involving conflicts of interest by those sitting on corporate
boards require disclosure, among other things). Indeed, for the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the "arbiter" par excellence of corporate disclosure, revealing conflicts of interest has
become the presumptive "cure-all" for corporate misbehavior. A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time
for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1073, 1088-89 (2005).
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or perhaps because of them--disclosure rules are among the most
safeguarding against bias resulting from
commonly suggested modes of
148
financial conflicts of interest.
c.

Views from Within

The more commentators envision medicine in traditional terms-as
a profession essentially centered around the physician-patient
relationship-themore likely they are to see disclosure as inadequate to
protect against bias in the face of physicians' financial links to industry.
On the whole, physicians favoring traditional models of practice are
least likely to view disclosure rules as adequately protective. 149 Dr.
Kassirer, for instance, discounts the claim that disclosure provides
sufficient protection against bias. 150 He presumes that physicians
collaborating with industry are likely to be biased and that disclosing
links to industry is unlikely to preclude or even balance the risks of
bias.151 In Dr. Kassirer's view, it is generally preferable to rely on the
opinions of doctors without connections to industry than on the opinions
of those linked with industry (disclosure notwithstanding).' 5 2 Dr.
Kassirer envisions medicine through the lens of the physician-patient
relationship, not through that of the business person. 53 He posits
"patient care and personal integrity" at the center of the physician's role
and would prefer in general that both practicing doctors and research
conflicts of interest rather than entertain, and then
physicians minimize
54
disclose, them. 1

In the world of medicine, as in the world of corporate commerce, disclosure rules have
become popular, perhaps, as several commentators have suggested, because they are minimally
disruptive to the status quo. See, e.g., Don A. Moore et al., Introduction to CONFLICTS OF INTEREST,
supra note 56, at 1, 5. For instance, the Pfizer-funded supplement that was distributed with an issue
of the American Journal of Cardiology,disclosed Pfizer's support. Stephen Smith, Article Urging
Heart Exams Shows Conflicting Interests, BOSTON GLOBE, July 25, 2006, at Al. The supplement
recommended significantly more standard cardiac screening of middle-aged people and more
follow-up tests. The effectiveness of the supplement's recommendations had not been
demonstrated; yet, if effected, it would cost Americans billions of dollars. Pfizer manufactures
Lipitor, a drug that lowers cholesterol. Id.
148. Moore et al., supranote 147, at 5.
149. See, e.g., Kassirer, Public Distrust, supra note 132.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Kassirer explains that he discounts the advice of doctors who "tout" company
products, preferring to heed the opinions of physicians who "decide that patient care and personal
integrity is more important than a $10,000 infusion into their bank accounts." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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In contrast, the more commentators see medicine as an enterprise
situated firmly in the marketplace and linked felicitously with industry,
the more likely they are to see rules of disclosure as adequate protection.
For instance, Dr. David Shaywitz welcomes links between physicians
and industry. 155 In his view, concerns about bias can largely be laid to
rest if physicians' links to industry are made "transparent" through
disclosure. 156
These contrasting perspectives are illustrated by the respective
positions of Drs. Kassirer and Shaywitz. Dr. Kassirer's view reflects
images of medicine as a profession distinct from the world of commerce;
in contrast, that of Dr. Shaywitz favors the amalgamation of medicine
and commerce. Taken together, these positions, and the differences
between them, sharply suggest the parameters of the debate about
financial conflicts of interest faced by physicians linked to industry.
Even more, these contrasting perspectives frame a more general debate
about the appropriate temper of the medical profession and the ends for
which physicians should strive; and more broadly still, they reflect the
debate about the future scope and nature of health care in the United
States.
2. Disclosure Rules and Informed Consent
Disclosure rules presume that the communication of information
levels the playing field. They thus presume that once all parties to an
interaction have the same relevant information, they are equally free to
mak6 choices that will likely prove fair and be maximally beneficial to
all involved.
How the debate about disclosure rules will be resolved in theory or
in practice is not clear. However, the development of rules about
informed consent in the context of patient care may be suggestive. The
informed consent doctrine relies on a set of presumptions similar to
57
those underlying disclosure rules. 1

155. Shaywitz, supra note 102. The opinion pieces by Drs. David Shaywitz and Jerome
Kassirer appeared alongside each other in The Boston Globe.
156. Id.
157. In 1914 then-Judge Cardozo ruled that, in general, patients should not be treated unless
they consent to care. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). About a
half-century later, courts began to require that a patient's consent be predicated on information. See
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 776, 779, 783, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that plaintiff
"made out a prima facie case of violation of the physician's duty to disclose" when the doctor failed
to inform the plaintiff about risks of surgery that plaintiff agreed to let the physician perform,
reversing a verdict directed for the doctor, and remanding for a new trial). For more information on
informed consent, see supra note 60.
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The notion that, except in unusual circumstances, patient care
should not be rendered absent the patient's consent has a long history in
common law.' 58 Only in the last decades of the twentieth century,
however, did states widely require physicians to provide patients with
material information about recommended treatment as part of the
consent process.159 These rules provide a useful model against which to
analyze disclosure rules imposed on physicians with financial links to
industry.
Yet there are important differences between disclosure rules and
informed consent rules. The former are aimed at precluding bias; the
latter are aimed at allowing patients to participate in making their health
care decisions. However, both sets of rules presume autonomous
individuality in a universe-that of medical care-that was defined in
very different terms only four or five decades ago. 160 In this regard, the
history of the informed consent doctrine offers a parallel to the
development of disclosure rules.
Both the promulgation of informed consent rules and the
development of rules requiring or suggesting that physicians disclose
financial conflicts of interest created by collaboration with industry have
been facilitated by the increasing significance of autonomous
individuality in defining relationships within the world of health care. In
both clinical and academic settings, the notion that shared information
can protect against unfairness presumes a universe of putatively equal,
autonomous individuals who, once provided with relevant information,
are able wisely to consent to or refuse treatment (in the first case) or
accurately to interpret a physician's opinions about products produced
by a company with which the physician has financial links (in the second
case). Each set of rules reflects the generalization of assumptions once
unique to the marketplace within the world of health care. In particular,
the valuation of autonomous individuality, once peripheral to the world
of health care, has long structured relationships within the

158. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 779; Paul A. Lombardo, Phantom Tumors and Hysterical
Women: Revising Our View of the Schloendorff Case, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 791, 799 & n.77
(2005) (citing Charles W. Lidz & Alan Meisel, Informed Consent and the Structure of Medical
Care, in 2 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 317 (President's Comm'n for

the Study of Ethical Problems in Med. & Biomedical Behavioral Research ed., 1982)).
159. The majority of states now have statutory rules regarding informed consent. See BARRY
R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 410 (5th ed. 2004).

160. See id. at 366; Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87
Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1063 (1993).
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marketplace.16 1 As the world of medicine merges more fully with the
world of commercial enterprise, the values of the marketplace displace
the values of traditional medicine.
3. New Assumptions Justify New Rules
Both rules governing informed consent, in the context of patient
care, and rules requiring disclosure of conflicts of interest, stemming
from links with industry, presume that the communication of
information establishes parity between those providing information and
those receiving information and that such parity protects against
unfairness. More generally, this presumes a universe of putatively equal,
autonomous individuals who, once informed, are free to make their own
choices-whether about treatment (in the context of informed consent
rules) or about biomedical research and pharmaceutical products (in the
context of disclosure rules). Both sets of rules reflect a shift away from
traditional understandings of medicine toward understandings that value
autonomous individuality and that assume marketplace relationships.
Such a vision was once peripheral to the world of health care.
Increasingly, it is at the center.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE WITHIN
MEDICINE: ONE PROFESSION OR Two?

In short, the assumptions undergirding the world of health care and
of medicine-as-a-profession contrast dramatically with the assumptions
that shaped and reflected the world of health care and the practice of
medicine a half-century ago. 162 On one side of the general debate among
physicians about health care, and of the more specific debate about
conflicts of interest facing health care providers, sit those who assume
that entrepreneurialism threatens health care. This group tends further to
presume that "professional" ethics are, and should remain, distinct from
the ethics of the corporate marketplace and that the profession's ethical
order should center around an understanding of the physician as healer
rather than around the physician-as-economic actor. 163 Other physicians
assume that medicine can flourish as an essentially entrepreneurial
endeavor, that the ethics of the profession can productively merge with
161. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Morality of Choice: Estate Planning and the Client Who
Chooses Not to Choose, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 31,32 (1998).
162. See, e.g., John H. McArthur & Francis D. Moore, The Two Cultures and the Health Care
Revolution: Commerce and Professionalism in Medical Care, 277 JAMA 985, 985 (1997)
(distinguishing between "commercial and professional traditions in the United States").
163. See, e.g., Relman, supra note 77, at 750-51.
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those of the marketplace, and in consequence, that the physician-aseconomic-actor can and should be at the center of the profession's selfidentity.'64
In effect, debate, particularly among physicians, about physicians'
financial links with industry involves disagreements across a wide
cultural divide.' 65 This divide separates those who-whether selfconsciously or not-side with a traditional perspective about medicine
from those who side with a perspective forged in the commercial
marketplace. This distinction in the world of medicine-between
traditional and commercial patterns-reflects the broader social
contrast 166 between a social arena grounded in the presumptions of
hierarchical relationships and interdependent trust, and a social arena
grounded in negotiation and choice. Within the larger society, domains
of life (including preeminently the family as well as religious
communities, and the universe of health care) once separated by practice
and belief from the world of the marketplace have merged more and
more completely with that world.' 67 On the whole, those within the
medical community who identify with traditional approaches to
medicine discourage financial links with industry. Those, however, who
are ready to displace traditional approaches to medicine with approaches
constructed in the marketplace, encourage the development of financial
links with industry, and expect that the ethics of the profession will
merge productively with the ethics of the world of commerce.
The fervor of debate and the extent of the ideological divide
suggest that medicine could well split into two distinct professions. This
would, in effect, entail the separate institutionalization of the contrasting
visions of medicine just outlined. One of the resulting professions,
focused directly on primary care, might preserve large parts of the social
frame that has shaped medicine in the United States since the start of the
nineteenth century. A second, distinct profession, focused on health care
but not on primary patient care, might merge with industry and
internalize assumptions that inform relationships in the marketplace.

164.
165.
(defining
166.
167.

See, e.g., Stossel, supra note 108, at 1061-64.
In particular, the culture divide is a divide in ideological perspective. See supra note 2
ideology).
See discussion supra Part ll.B.
See, e.g., supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE(S)

Disagreements about links to industry constitute a microcosm of
more general disagreements about market-driven health care. And that
discourse, in turn, is a microcosm for an even more general discourse
about the social implications of blurring fences that once separated
various domains of life (including the world of health care) from the
freedoms and the insults of the marketplace.
Amalgamating health care with the marketplace does not
necessitate abandoning ethical constraint. It does, however, mean
replacing an ethic that presumed communal solidarity within an
essentially hierarchical social setting with an ethic centered around
choice, bargain, and profit. 168 The two ethics begin with different
assumptions and look toward different ends. One is the ethic of medicine
before the last decades of the twentieth century. It is closer to the ethic
of the traditional family than to that of the marketplace. The other is the
ethic of the corporation and the larger world of commerce. To some
extent, each ethic can be hedged with the essential protections
presumptively provided by the other. Or perhaps, as suggested, medicine
will split into two professions-one that focuses on primary patient care
and that preserves many of the social rules assumed by medicine in
earlier decades, and a second, related profession that focuses on
research, depends on financial links with industry, and relies on rules
that define life in the larger commercial marketplace.

168. See, e.g., McArthur & Moore, supra note 162, at 985-86 (differentiating between
"professional" and "commercial" cultures in medicine). McArthur and Moore describe the
"fundamental act of professional medical care" as:
[T]he assumption of responsibility for the patient's welfare-an unwritten contract
assured by a few words, a handshake, eye contact denoting mutual understanding, or
acknowledgment by the physician that "[w]e will take care of you." The essential image
of the professional is that of a practitioner who values the patient's welfare above his or
her own and provides service even at a fiscal loss and despite physical discomfort, or
inconvenience. There is no outside invested capital seeking returns from the physician's
work.
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